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The Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research in 1997 examined the performance
of alternative organizational structures in a simulated joint operational environment. It also evaluated the
structural preferences of experimental teams representing Joint Task Forces. Teams were asked to choose
between three alternative organizational designs that varied in degree of similarity to the structure in which
teams had been previously trained, thus testing teams’ willingness to change. While a number of related
papers in this Proceedings examine both the results of teams’ decision choice and the simulated performance
of the alternative architectures, the purpose of this research is to capitalize on the military expertise of
research participants. This paper presents the analysis of twenty-two officers with operational backgrounds
who used models of organization theory to critique the experimentally derived structures. The contribution of
this component of the A2C2 research is to enlighten our understanding of the critical features defined by
operationally experience military officers as they considered structural adaptability and performance
effectiveness in a joint mission context. This perspective is important to enhancing the generalizability of the





From analysis of recent DoD missions and planning documents that anticipate future mission requirements, it
is evident that geopolitical changes have increased the DoD focus on joint operations and on Operations
Other than War (OOTW). A consequence of these changes is the need to determine appropriate
organizational structures that utilize the potential of advances in information technology but also recognize
the possible component differences in expertise, role definition, goal definition, values, and capability.
Arguments are being made that traditional command and control structures should be reconsidered (e.g.,
Alberts & Hayes, 1995). Specific recommendations have been made to consider mission-based structures as
an alternative to structures defined in terms of functional componency (air, sea, land, special operations)
(Krulak, 1997). Finally, VADM Cebrowski (1998) has recently argued that the goal of Joint Vision 2010 for
information superiority to increase speed of command cannot be accomplished solely through network
centric information capabilities. The advances in technology must be accompanied with changes in process
and organizational structure that respond and adapt readily to changes in information and environment.
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The purpose of the Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (A2C2) research program is to
determine the characteristics of organization structure that can provide the adaptability required by the vision
described above. Adaptability is determined by both the human willingness to change and the flexibility of
given structures and processes to meet the requirements of a changing environment. The A2C2 experiment
conducted in 1997 was designed to assess the human decision element in adapting organization structures
(see Hocevar, 1998) and to evaluate the comparative performance of three alternative structures in a
laboratory simulation of a Joint Task Force mission. (See Benson et al., 1998 for an elabora-tion of the
purpose and design of the experiment and other related A2C2 papers for presentation of experimental
findings.) This paper analyzes the characteristics of the structural alternatives that were identified by a
subsample of research participants with operational experience as being most important to effective
performance, not in the laboratory, but in an actual operational environment. Their analyses were based on





Organizational structure is defined by multiple parameters including: differentiation, centraliza-tion, decision
rights, formalization, departmental-ization, and coordination mechanisms. The particular structural
requirements of an organization are dependent on both the nature of the tasks being performed and the
environment in which it operates (see e.g., Davis, 1995, Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Sengupta, et al. 1996).
Figure 1 reflects the determinants and parameters of organizational structure that are typically defined by
organization theory. The challenge facing those interested in modeling organization design, is to identify the
predictive relationship between environment, task, structure, and the desired outcome of successful
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2.1 Duncan’s (1979) Organizational Design Decision Tree Heuristic
 
Duncan (1979) describes a decision tree analysis that can be used to determine organizational structure
characteristics that fit particular environment and task requirements. The purpose of organizational structure
is to reduce uncertainty in decision making. This can be accomplished through enhanced information flow,
structuring assets to reduce information requirements, and the integration of interdependent specialist
requirements using appropriate coordination mechanisms (Galbraith, 1995). But, the appropriate
segmentation of functions and resources, and the related requirements for information and coordination
depend on the nature of the task and the environment (e.g., Scott, 1998). Duncan uses Thompson’s (1967)
model of task interdependence and the environmental characteristics of complexity and stability (Lawrence &
Lorsch, 1967) to derive a decision-tree for determining an appropriate organizational structure.
 
The first aspect of Duncan’s (1979) decision tree analysis (see Figure 2) addresses environmental complexity.
The decision model predicts that organizations with environments that are simple, stable, and predictable
work well with centralized, functionally structured designs. The strengths of this structural type are
standardized procedures, clear decision hierarchy, and in-depth specialized skill development. The limitations
of this structural type are slow, hierarchic decision making, focus on functional rather than total
organizational goals, low innovation, and low cross-functional coordination.
 
As environmental complexity increases, organizations also become more complex in order to respond to the
diversity of environmental demands; and this organizational complexity is a source of uncertainty. One
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purpose of organization design is to reduce the complexity of the environment with which the organization
must deal. Thus, part of the assessment of complexity to determine whether the organizational environment
can be segmented.
 
Segmentation reduces uncertainty because organizational sub-units can be designed such that each has
responsibility for a less complex environmental domain. This is typically referred to as a "divisional"
structure (e.g., Mintzberg, 1993). Segmentation, in the business literature, is typically defined in terms of
such aspects as products, geographic regions, or customer groups. For the military, segmentation strategies
can be geographic or mission based. Duncan characterizes this organizational form as "decentralized"
because significant decision authority is vested in sub-ordinate divisions. Duncan defines decentralized
structures as having limited need for coordination between divisional units. The decentralization and limited
need for coordination enables divisional units to readily and quickly adapt to changes in environmental
factors. The disadvantages of divisional structures include the difficulty in allocating resources that may be
required by more than one division and the potential neglect of higher level integration of effort because of
divisions giving priority to local over organizational goals.
 
A modification in the language used by Duncan is proposed here. As shown in Figure 2, the authors have
used "divisional" rather than "decentralized" as the structure appropriate to environments that can be
segmented. The reason for this change is that the location of decision authority ("decentralization") can be
independent of whether a structure is functional or divisional. While, as noted above, functional structures are
frequently more centralized, there is a leadership decision style that is also suggested by decentralization.
Thus, a platoon may represent a functional component of an organization, and a battalion commander may,
following the tenets of maneuver warfare, rely substantially on decentralized authority (following
commander’s intent).
 
Both divisional and functional organizations have varying requirements for coordination depending on the
extent of environmental dynamics and degree of task interdependence (Thompson, 1967). If the environment
is stable and predictable and there is low interdependence between the organizational subunits, Duncan’s
decision tree predicts that decision authority can be centralized and there are only limited requirements for
coordination mechanisms.
 
Functionally structured organizations traditionally rely on vertical coordination through hierarchy or
formalized rules and procedures. It is clear that these centralized methods can only be effective in predictable
and stable situations. Rules require predictable patterns; and relying on vertical integration through senior
authority in the chain of command is not effective in rapidly changing situations where timeliness of response
is a critical success factor.
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2.2 Galbraith’s (1977) Information Processing Model of Organization Design
 
Galbraith (1977) argues that as task interdependence increases, and environmental uncertainty increases, two
organization design strategies can address the limitations of the vertical coordination mechanisms typically
relied on by functional structures. These design strategies alternatively address the information processing
requirements facing the organization. The first design alternative is to reduce information processing needs
through such mechanisms as slack resources, segmentation, or self-contained departments. This is the
concept underlying Duncan’s decentralized structure described above.
 
The second design alternative is to increase the organization’s information processing capacity through
information systems or lateral coordination mechanisms. Determination of the appropriate lateral
mechanisms of coordination depends on the degree of task interdependence. If interdependence is limited,
intermittent or temporary, adequate lateral coordination can be accomplished through informal direct contact,
liaison roles, or temporary task forces. When sequential or reciprocal interdependence characterizes the
nature of ongoing task requirements, more formal lateral mechanisms such as cross-functional teams or
matrix structures may be a more appropriate design. Any of these lateral mechanisms can be used by
functional or divisional organizations to allow the organization to more effectively respond to high
information requirements or high environmental uncertainty.
 
 
2.3 Implications of DoD Mission Environments and Task Technologies
 
Given the increasing turbulence in the environments in which organizations must perform (Emery & Trist,
1973), fewer organizations can be effective using the hierarchic, formalized, centralized, functionally defined
structural form. To assume one can determine a single "best form" of organization design is likely to be a
prescription for failure; unless that form has inherent capabilities to adapt to changing environmental and task
requirements. These capabilities derive largely from lateral mechanisms of coordination; and these
mechanisms are substantially enabled by the increased availability of information through advances in
technology (Cebrowski, 1998).
 
Davis (1995) supports the application of organization theory to the determination of appropriate structures for
defense organizations. He argues that when technology (translated as mission) is both highly variable and
difficult to analyze to a deterministic conclusion, organizational structures should be low in formalization and
centralization. Needed coordination thus results from less formal mechanisms such as group norms and
lateral (vice hierarchical) interactions.
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The objective of the A2C2 research was to evaluate both the choice and performance outcomes of nine 6-
person "JTF" teams who were offered three alternative architectures that varied in the extent to which they
were functionally or mission (task) defined. The simulated mission was a complex military operation
involving land, sea, air and space assets. Mission tasks required the application of specific assets to
eliminating enemy targets or taking strategic positions (e.g., seaport). More complex tasks required the use of
multiple assets. Model-based researchers on the A2C2 project formulated the alternative architectures to be
distinctly differentiated on the requirements for coordination (see Figure 3). That is, using the specific
mission task requirements, assets were grouped in one architecture (A1) such that a minimum amount of
coordination between "departments" would be required. (See Figure 4 for the explanation of asset acronyms
given participants in the experiment.) Architecture A1 would be characterized by the Duncan model as a
divisional structure with limited coordination. Each component of this organization comprised multiple
functional specialties such as ground (INF=infantry) and air (CAS=close air support) capabilities. This
architecture had one open communication net.
The architecture A0, with which the participants were most familiar, had assets distributed such that the most
coordination would be required. According to Duncan’s model, this would be considered a functional
structure with lateral coordination. This architecture used two communication nets with CLF (JTG1.2) acting
as the communication link between superior and subordinate commanders. Finally, architecture A2 required
an intermediate amount of coordination between departments to achieve the mission objectives and (for all
but 1 team) also used two communication nets linked through CLF. Intended as an intermediate form between
A1 and A0, this structure does not fall cleanly into either of Duncan’s distinctive categories.
 
Participating team members were military officers (of rank O-3 and O-4). (See Benson et al., 1998 for an
elaboration for the simulation and experimental design.) A subset of the participants in this study were
enrolled in a Master’s level course in Organization and Management. As a follow-up to the simulation
experiment, these students were asked to use Duncan’s (1979) model for determining appropriate
organizational structure given the situation description and mission op-order. The difference between this
analysis and the one teams used in their experimental planning sessions is that they were asked to critique the
structures for use in an actual military operation rather than for use in the laboratory simulation.
 
The data for this study are the narrative arguments presented in the student papers. Particular emphasis will
be given to the 22 officers who had operational (rather than support) backgrounds given the interest in
generalizing the laboratory research to an actual Joint Task Force operating environment. This analysis
allowed research participants to provide an "expert" view (both in terms of their simulation and their military
background) as to the potential advantages and disadvantages of alternative structures without the limiting
constraints of the laboratory experiment. Students also had the option to propose their own alternative
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architecture and defend its merits using the theoretical model.
 
The narrative analyses were approximately 600 words each. Three readers independently reviewed each of
the papers to summarize the students’ application of the Duncan model to the selection of an appropriate
organizational structure. In addition, themes were identified that elaborated the student analyses of the aspects






4.1 Analysis of Structural Requirements
Following the Duncan decision tree presented in Figure 2, all 22 of the officers assessed the JTF operating
environment as complex and dynamic. However, there was not uniform agreement as to whether the
environment could be segmented. Only eight officers specified that the environment could be segmented.
This is an important factor in determining the appropriate organizational structure according to Duncan
(1977). Specifically, about half of the analyses concluded a functional structure would be appropriate and
about half determined the divisional structure. Students’ discussions of the relative advantages and limitations
of the functional and divisional forms are elaborated in the sections below.
 
Regardless of the preference of functional or divisional (task-based) structure, there was substantial
agreement as to the need for lateral coordination mechanisms. Because of the dynamics of the environment,
adaptability and speed were identified as important organizational characteristics. In support of the Duncan
model, lateral mechanisms were recommended as critical to effective organizational performance. These
mechanisms were argued to be instrumental to accomplishing specific task coordination, and to adapting both
dynamics of the environment and the high need for information exchange. Regarding coordination, the
following quote illustrates the comments of most officers:
 
"The ability to coordinate is a far more valuable asset than any one material resource…Liaison
and coordination is more important than organizational design."
A related argument was used by several officers who rejected the choice of organization design based on a
segmented environment (Duncan, 1977). Their stated concern was that if the environment was defined as
segmentable, the resulting organization design could be a divisional organization with assets distributed to
minimize inter-unit coordination requirements. While this would allow efficient performance of the mission
tasks that were used to define the composition of autonomous units, the resulting reduction of coordination
could also reduce the organization’s ability to both meet unpredicted events and to provide necessary overall
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force protection.
 
"Decentralization" was described as a characterization of effective organization design in approximately 75%
of the student analyses. However, as noted in the discussion of the theoretical models, there was a mixed
interpretation of this term. According to Duncan’s (1977) usage, decentralization is equivalent to divisional
structures (based on segmented environments). However, a broader definition of this term includes the
location of decision authority. It is the latter meaning of delegated decision autonomy that the majority of
officers used to define the structural parameter that would effectively respond to a dynamic, complex, and
unpredictable operational environment.
 
An interesting comment made by several of the officers was the relationship between the number of
communication nets and decentralization. Specifically, it was noted that the architectures that used two
communications nets with CLF as the linking node (i.e., A0 and A2) allowed for greater decentralization of
authority to the JTU commanders (Snake, Gator, Spectre). Two explanations emerged from the thematic
analysis of the officers’ comments. First, the two comm nets reduced the overall quantity of communication
on each net and thus allowed for improved coordination through information exchange at the JTU level. This
recommendation reinforces the current DoD use of separate comm nets to focus transmissions on those that
impact the net users, thus decreasing confusion and improving communications efficiency. The second stated
value of separate comm nets is to limit the intervention that can occur when communication systems
encourage "unnecessary" hierarchical involvement. Officers remarked that with the two comm nets, CLF
acted as a filter for communications both up and down the chain. This "protected" the decentralized decision
making of the JTUs and allowed FLAG to concentrate on operational vice tactical issues.
 
4.2 Analyses Specific to A1 and A0
 
Following the analysis of task and environment using the Duncan model, students focused their critique on
the specific organizational options. All students who discussed experimentally proposed structures (rather
than their own recommended options) focused on structures A1 and A0 as offering the most distinctive (and
contrasting) characteristics. Most of the student analyses characterized the proposed A1 architecture as a
divisional organization with limited lateral coordination requirements. This structure was recognized as
having been designed based on an environment segmented by specific mission tasks.
 
While A1 was seen as advantageous in terms of the reduced need for inter-nodal coordination, several
students expressed concern about using this structure in an actual operating environment. One concern was
the scope and variety of specialist capabilities under one command. As noted by one Marine respondent,
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"It is important not to overburden any commander with assets that expand their command
authority over too large [and diverse] a force. [This can] decrease the speed of decision making –
essentially eliminating the very advantages of a decentralized organization."
 
This concern about the complexity of a decision node becoming a potential bottleneck was not limited to A1.
Several officers identified the role of CLF in archtectures A0 and A2 as potentially problematic, if the CJTG
did not delegate significant decision authority to subordinate commanders:
 
"CLF controls both the land and sea assets of the amphibious assault. The scope of the missions
is too large and requires a division between the landing force and the ARG. CLF’s attention
would be constantly divided between the two forces, reducing his overall warfighting ability."
The role complexity implications extend also to the question of expertise to handle diverse assets. As one
navy commander stated:
 
"Fighter aircraft [other than CAS] under the operational control of a Marine landing force
assigned to take a beach cannot work. The work tasks, specialization, and training are different
for different warfare areas."
Another concern was that this structure was designed to meet the requirements of a given set of tasks and this
design could be ill suited to responding to unanticipated requirements. A number of students argued that there
is significant risk in designing a structure to optimize performance on a given set of mission tasks, unless
there is adequate capability to adapt to changing requirements. This concern is supported by organizational
theorists (e.g. Mintzberg, 1993) whose research demonstrates that a limitation of the divisional organization
is the likely focus on divisional rather than organizational goals and requirements. The following quote from
a naval officer’s analysis illustrates this potential problem:
 
"[In A1], FLAG would be responsible for coordinating the shared defenses, yet he would have to
rely on the JTGs to respond. The JTGs may be too busy or actively involved in [their] task to be
able to quickly respond. The casualty rate would be high if enemy forces discovered this
weakness."
 
4.3 Application of the Galbraith Model
Two strategies for designing organizations based on information processing requirements (Galbraith, 1977)
are reflected in the students’ critical discussion of architectures A0 and A1. One strategy is to reduce
information processing requirements by creating "self-contained" departments. This was the principle
underlying the A2C2 model-based researchers’ optimization of architecture A1. The second strategy for
design is to increase information processing capabilities. This was the design strategy students reported as
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underlying A0 as it would be used to carry out a JTF mission. While there were not specific lateral
mechanisms (e.g. liaison roles) evident in A0, the students’ pursued necessary coordination processes as they
implemented this structure in the simulation. This experience demonstrated the benefits of lateral
communication and coordination (vice hierarchic control and direction) in accomplishing the mission with
the speed required.
 
A number of officers stated that a benefit of the A0 architecture was the distribution of assets such that inter-
nodal coordination was required. They argued that this requirement would provide an adaptive capability
needed to respond to environmental dynamics and environmental uncertainty with a quick, coordinated
action. Unanticipated threats, or the general need to "protect the forces" in addition to fulfill the specified
mission tasks require coordination capabilities between decision makers. The following quote, from a Marine
O-4, contrasts the perceived risk of a structural design that emphasizes autonomous divisions (like A1) with a
structure designed to require inter-unit coordination (like A0). His statement reflects comments made by
several officers:
 
"The situational awareness in A1 suffers because each component member can become too
focused on their own tasks. Without forced coordination, they may not maximize the use of their




Several conclusions result from the analysis of data relevant to the Duncan (1977) decision heuristic for
organization design. First, the officers were in uniform agreement that the JTF environment is complex and
dynamic with high information requirements. There was a fairly even split on the appropriateness of
segmenting the environment. Some saw merit in segmenting the environment and designing an organization
structure that could capitalize on the efficiencies of decentralized divisions to accomplish missions tasks with
limited inter-unit coordination. Others felt that this focus on unit-level efficiency could put the overall
mission at risk if units became to insular in their focus. This group of officers recommended retaining a
functional organization.
 
A substantial and important finding is the agreement among these officers that the most critical design feature
is lateral coordination capabilities. These were identified as important to meet the adaptive requirements of
the dynamic environment. Relatedly, decentralized decision authority was argued as another design parameter
that is needed to achieve both speed and flexibility.
 
The results also have implications to the Galbraith (1977) model for alternative organization strategies based
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on information processing requirements. These are reflective of the increasing availability and influence of
information through advancing technology. As noted above, officers acknowledged the value of limiting
information processing requirements both in terms of the two-comm net design and the grouping of assets to
minimize the need for coordination. But, the strongest recommendation emerging from these analyses was
Galbraith’s alternative strategy for increasing information processing capabilities. Specifically, the officers
uniformly argued for the importance of developing lateral coordination capabilities including information
exchange and decentralized decision authority. In fact, they argued against the use of developing self-
contained units without lateral coordination mechanisms. Thus, the conclusion suggested is that there are
risks inherent in pursuing Galbraith’s recommended design strategy of reducing information processing
requirements in isolation from the second strategy of increasing information processing capability. And if
these officers’ analyses are correct, the latter strategy will be more predictive of successful performance.
 
As stated in the introduction, the emerging geopolitical environment and advances in information technology
have led senior military leaders to call for changes in the very nature of our forces. They seek smaller, more
agile forces that can rapidly adapt their command and control (C2) architecture to suit the task and
environment, and thus operate inside the enemy’s decision cycle (speed of command) (see, e.g., Cebrowski,
1998).
 
The adaptation can take place in the C2 process, the C2 structures or both. Recognizing this, the A2C2
research project includes both processes and structure in the definition of the command and control
architecture. Within each of these dimensions, an architecture can be characterized as being rigid, robust or
adaptable. Robust refers to an architecture that, without changing its fundamental structure, can respond to a
variety of environmental and task demands. Adaptable refers to an organization that can readily change its
structure to meet the dynamic demands of the environment and tasks. A rigid architecture is one that is
uniquely suited to only a limited set of environmental and tasks parameters
 
The prevailing thinking seems to be that the "ideal" architecture would be "flatter," with fewer layers in the
hierarchy and adaptable in both process and structure (see, e.g., Cerowski, 1998, Krulak, 1997). But, this was
not the general theme in the officer-student papers analyzed here. Several students offered alternative
architectures, and all of them were designed with three layers, equaling the largest number in any of the
architectures in the experiment. Moreover, in their proffered architectures and in their discussions, the officer-
students espoused architectures that we would refer to as robust in the structural dimension rather than
adaptable. Significant lateral coordination mechanisms, coupled with decentralized decision authority,
advanced technology and the common operation picture, would enable them to handle changes in task and
environment through coordination rather than structural change. While the students whose data were reported
here would describe this as "adaptation," we argue that it more accurately reflects robustness given the
definitions we propose above.
 
One reason for the student preferences for a "robust" architecture may be that there are some natural
constraints on structural adaptation. The commander and the staff must be competent and comfortable with
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the architecture they adapt into if they are to use their assets effectively and efficiently. Technology may
allow increasing the span of control over similar entities, but that is quite different from increasing the
number of types of entities under command. The effects of increasing the breadth of control is likely
magnified in the A2C2 simulation since each player represented a commander and staff and was responsible
for performing the actual actions for all of the entities under their control (at the computer terminal). This is
contrasted with an actual situation, where the commander would observe and direct with the advice of the
staff. Subordinates fully qualified to employ the assets under their control would take the actual actions.
 
Another reason may be that the students were not given the concept of rapidly and repeatedly adapting the
architecture (especially the structure) to optimally fit the task and environment. Rather, they viewed the
architecture selected for the mission as one they would remain in throughout. Several expressed concern that
being in an architecture tailored for the specific task at hand would leave them ill-prepared if unexpected
changes in the task or environment occurred (which they usually do.)
 
Of course, there will always be at least one commander with an all-encompassing domain of authority at
some level in a JTF (e.g., the CJTF). But, how far down into the architecture it is feasible or desirable to
extend this "broadening" of authority and how quick the organization should be to adapt its structure are open
questions. Changing the structure as the task and environment change to minimize the requirements for inter-
nodal coordination at the tactical level, as was done for architecture A1, may result in structures that embrace
warfighting domains that are traditionally discrete (e.g., undersea warfare, ground combat, and theater missile
defense). These new structures may also require a broad mix of combat support and combat service support
domains that the command is not currently prepared to assume.
 
If experiments and exercises reveal that it is in fact desirable to task organize broadly down to low levels in
the JTF and to do so relatively quickly and frequently (through adaptation), mechanisms will have to be
found to loosen these constraints. Some ideas are to: to train officers earlier in their careers with many
different asset mixes, and to practice more distributed decision making (self-synchronizing). Methods must
be developed to handle the broad range of combat support and combat service support functions associated
with the diverse set of assets while keeping the fighting force small and agile. That is, the principles used to
design the combat support and combat service support architectures should be the same as those used to
design an adaptive C2 architecture.
 
An interesting, but not unusual, research challenge emerges from this discussion; the results of experiments
and exercises are needed to determine whether this type of adaptation is desirable. If it is, mechanisms for
making commanders comfortable with command over a dynamically changing, broader domain must be
developed. But, in order to conduct the experiments properly, this comfort will have to be developed in the
experimental players.
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